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SOME POLITICAL AND MORAL
ISSUES INVOLVED I DECENT-
RALIZI G THE WELFARE STATE
With particular emphasis
on ew Zealand
During the last decade or so politicians and bureaucrats of the
welfare state have been faced with ever increasing problems.
Some of the predominant chaUenges confronting the guardians of
the welfare state are growing expenditures, mounting awareness
of the complexity of giving adequate medical and social services,
rigidities of organizational solutions anu diminishing backing in
the population in favor of the welfare state. The literature on cri-
ses in the welfare state, by the welfare state and of the welfare
state illustrates the problems and provides the acauemic frame-
work for analysis of the situation (although the notion of crisis is
severely chaUenged by several authors).
The welfare state is a relatively new social phenomenon and
there are no precedents, neither for the problems that have emer-
ged, nor for the solutions available. When confronted with prob-
lems the development so far seems to have been a return to solu-
tions of the past. In all kinds of welfare states the tendency has
been to call again upon the market forces and reduce state inter-
vention, to shift health and social programmes from the public to
the private sector and upgrade the role of the family, to return
centralized responsibilities to the local communities, and to em-
phasize selective measures at the expense of universal welfare
state programmes. Jt looks like these "solutions" have swept all
over the world, regardless of the size and content of the problems
they are intended to solve. "The demands [or these measures
have been set fo/ward indepenuenl of the degree of development
of the welfare state or the colour of the political party in power.
They have also been forwarded independent of whether ccono-
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mic difficulties have penetrated the national economies or only
touched upon the fringes, whether state intervention and bureau-
cratic responsibility are extensive or limited, and whether natio-
nal unemployment rates are unusually high or moderate." (Oyen,
1986: 10). The picture is such that questions can be raised as to
the logical relationship between the solutions offered and the
problems the welfare state is facing.
In the following we shalJ take a closer look at one of these so-
lutions, namely decentralization, and analyze different political
strategies involved in obtaining this goal.
Decentralization as a solution
Decentralization takes many forms, and the empirical evidence of
the effect of different kinds of decentralization in the welfare
state is scarce. Decentralization is usually seen as the shifting of
responsibility for a certain program or problem from a higher to a
lower administrative level. The legitimating force behind the de-
mands for increased decentralization is a perceived need for
more democracy and local authority, to be achieved through
shorter links between administration and consumers. As in the
early works of Himmelstrand it is stressed that the transmission
of information, choice and influence on decision making are es-
sential factors for the functioni.ng of an "ideal" democracy (Him-
melstrand, 1960: 206-210). But important elements in demanding
change through more decentralization are also conflicts over the
control of resources and the organization, power struggles be-
tween different professional groups concerning their relationship
to the consumers, and a scepticism to the role of the state and the
central bureaucracy as providers of welfare services.
Britain can here serve as a case demonstrating the ongoing
discussion on decentralization. But Hungary, for example, could
just as easily be brought forward as a case (Verebelyi, 1986), in
order to show the universality of the discussion.
Social scientists strongly disagree as to the value of shifting the
responsibility for social programs from the central level to the pe-
riphery. It is generally accepted that there is a need for more effi-
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cient social ser.ices. that the deliverv of services hould be more
humane, and that services in cash a~d kind should I e more fairlv
diStributed. But while there seems to be some unity as to th~
goals (0 be achieved. it seems more difficult (0 reach a joint pusi-
!Lon on the diagnosis of the problems and the adequale strategies
to be promoted. The dilemma is shared by so ialist politicians
who are divided between the supporters of the traditional centra-
Lized welfare state and the supporters of "new egalitarianism"
who see a renewal of sociali'm through increased decentraliza-
tion (Fudge, 1984).
Hambleton and Haggett are among those British social scien-
tists advancing the notion lhat given certain organizational con-
ditions decentralization below the administrative level of the
municipality ca- be 'et:n as an instrument for achieving neces 'ary
and long overdue changes in the welfare state. Besides improving
the quality of [he welfare services. decentralization in lheir view
forces the welfare services to become more need-based and equi-
table, because the vi ibility of the services also make them mon.:
accountable to the public. They set:: the political awareness ill the
community mounting as people's sense of ownership of the st::r-
vices increases, thereby winning public support for the collective
provisions of local services (Hambleton and Haggett, 1984: 1-13).
The argument is carried further when it is maintained that an-
other objective of decentralization is to become a challenge to the
existing professionalized welfare state apparatlls (ibid., 28), and
to break the monopoly control of state professional production
(ibid., 29).
Pinker i.s one of the exponents for those social scientists who
sees increasing decentralization as seriously undermining the very
nature of the welfare stale. Allhough he accepts the many ill10ma·
lies created by a centralized bureaucracy he argues that further
decentralization will create anomalies that are even harsher on
those who depend the most on the welfare state. The closer the
professionals, as well as the non-professionals, come to the clio
ents, the more likely it is that personal characteristics of the
clients, and not the need of the clients, will influence the judge-
ment of those in charge. The acceptance of universalistic princip-
les are at the core of the welfare state, and decentralization and
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the extended use of discretion are not in accordance with univer-
salism. The state, and the distance between the givers and receiv-
ers, are so far the best guarantees for a socially and geographical-
ly fair distribution of benefits (Pinker, 1982).
How much decentralization?
The patchwork approach to decentralization goes even further in
dissolving the relationship to established administrative units,
when decomposing the target population for the services into
small "patches" of 100-500 household which are located in geo-
graphical and social proximity. The linkage to the grassroots is
emphasized through the recruitment of personel in and by the
community (Hardie, 1986).
The example illustrates the point that there is no natural nu-
merical point at which it can be said that the process of decentra-
lization has been completed. The only logical stopping point for
the "bottom up" approach is the single individual.
There is no scientific evidence which can solve the classical
choice between centralization and decentralization. Whatever or-
ganizational form is chosen there are inherent gains and losses,
sometimes for the same groups, sometimes for different groups
or society at large (Rupel, 1988). The issues touch upon such basic
questions as the democratic forms and the collective rights versus
the individual rights of the citizens. Therefore, the choice between
centralization and decentralization becomes a matter of political
and moral decisions, more than a matter ofsocial engineering. Once
these decisions have been made, in principle decentralized orga-
nizations can be tailored to the goals to be obtained.
Three of the small and well established welfare states can
serve as examples of different ways of facing the dilemmas involv-
ed in decentralization as solutions to pending problems. Norway,
Denmark and New Zealand are among those welfare states
where cautious decentralization has aimed at transferring a limit-
ed number of social programs and competence from the central
and county level to the municipal level, the so-called 1st decentra-
lization (Prahl et ai., 1988: 15-33). Some of the larger municipali-
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ties in turn have carried this development into still smaller oeo-
graphical units for delivering social services, or have placelthe
responsibility with ethnic groups or minority groups 10 be served,
the so-called 2nd decentralization. The state is carrying part of
the expenses for the programs. and the tendency is towards the
use of block grants instead of earmarked grants, and an increas-
mg transfer of the financial burden and control [0 lhe periphery.
The reasoning in favor of intensifying decentralization i the
same as everywhere else. The value of local democracy, beCter re-
sponse to individual needs. and more l1exibility in organizati nal
accomodation to the community in order to produce efficient and
cost saving units, are vital parts of the legitimating arguments
(Kjellberg, 1989: 4).
The arguments produce a IllLxed bag of ideological and finan-
cial goals to be pursued (Klllln/e, 1980). Denmark and ew Zea-
land are among those coulllries that have experienced severe fi-
nancial constraints on the welfare stale, and this is refkcted in
the discussion. orway may now be heading for the same deve-
lopment, and lately financial arguments have cOllle into focus
there as well. Common for the three countries is the explicit call
for extended involvement of the citizens in the social programs,
the so-called 3rd decentralization. This phenomenon can be inter-
preted in at least three ways. On the one hand the invitation to
more involvement can be seen as a democratizing measure, trying
to dose the gap between the information-rich and the informa-
tion-poor (Szecsko, 1986: 438). On the other hand new ideas have
penetrated large segments of the informed public. calling for indi-
viduals to take more responsibiJity for their own wellbeing, aquire
knowledge which was formerly reserved for the welfare profes-
sions and to engage actively in preventive work and influence the
content of ~ocial programs. A third interpretation i~ of a more
financial nature, as privatization, cleinstitutionalization ancl trans-
fer of welfare activities to voluntary agencies become in~truments
for shifting the economy from the public to the privatI:: arena.
Comlllon for the ~entiment in the three welfare state~ i~ al~o a
pronounced need for more preci~e knowledge about the function-
ing of the ~ocial programs and the ~ituation at the "gras~root"
level. While the gap between those providing tht.: services and the
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consumers may not actually have widened, the need for informa-
tion in order to produce more rational decisions has certainly in-
creased. The immense costs of the programs make it pertinent to
the bureaucracy to secure information which allows an evaluation
of the investments. The sizeable number of potential voters bene-
fitting from the programs makes it just as important to the politi-
cians to evaluate the success of the programs. But few of the pro-
grams have been constructed in such a way as to give continuous
and consistent feedback about the actual functioning of the pro-
gram, the distribution of the services and the coverage of needs.
However, the three countries have chosen different profiles in
their striving to mobilize local problem solving.
The Norwegian approach has been rather loyal to the existing
administrative structure, and innovations have mainly been linked
to the establisment. The decentralizing measures have not only
been geographical, but have included transfers of competence as
well as delegation of decisionmaking. Although the actual shift of
programs to the local level has increased, the ties between central
and local authorities are traditionally so intertwined and many-
fold that it is difficult to sort alit the power relations between the
different administrative levels (Strand, 1985: 17). The Norwegian
Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Government Administration
initiated a general scheme aimed at providing better access to
public services, including welfare services, and the Ministry of So-
cial Affairs followed up. Social scientists have been invited to re-
view social programs, evaluate alternative organizational solu-
tions and provide data for decision making, based on the experi-
ence of the consumers. New channels of appeal and feedback
have been established, such as an ombudsman for health services
on the county level. And built into social legislation is a provision
which gives room for experimentation with new social programs
and extensive discretion. A key word to understanding the deve-
lopment is consumer participation (NOV: 38, 1988).
Denmark has gone through somewhat of the same develop-
ment as Norway, but during the last couple of years chosen a
more experimental path. Underlying the change of direction is
among other things a disillusionment with social scientists who
have f(l iled to develop adequate research results to help the poli-
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tici,tns and bureallcrats sort out the political and moral dilemmas
Imbedded in the welfare state. This !!oes hand in hand with the
call for debureaucratization set fonva-rd by the Conserv,lli\'e gO\'-
ernment, and the call for bener control with the professions, set
focv.'arel by the bureaucracv. In 1%8 Parliamt'nt eranted :'0 mil-
lion d.kr., and another 100 million d.kr. for each Zlf the followinl!,
three years. to be earm..lrked for local initiatives in the social sec':.
tor. lndivi iuals or groups of citizens, voluntary organizations and
local administrations are im'ited to come forward with projects
that can further new solutions to social problems or have a posi-
tive impact on preventive work. As examples are mel1lioned acti-
vities for very young children, help to families in a difficult situa-
tion, and care for the elderly. handicapped, immigrants or those
who are permanently institutionlized. The idea is to involve more
people in problems concerning their everyday life and to make
use of the experience of lay people. It is specific,"ly stated that
projects transgressing administrative and professional borders are
given prior it)', since it is important to break down traditional
a elm inistra tive proced ures (Socia/minis/eriets lIl!vik/ingsll/id/,-,-,
1(88). In short, social problems are no longer to be seen as the
property of the professions or the social administration. The
Ministry of Social Aflairs is responsible for the allocation of
funds, thereby shortcutting the distance between the centre and
the periphery, and undermining the power base for the local so-
cial administration. The social scientists are also being bypassed,
in particular those at the government financed institute for ap-
plied social research where for many years the ministry has com-
missioned its research.
Consulting the peOIJle
New Zealand has gone even further in experimenting wilh the
bottom-up approach, hereby creating new !lows of information
between users and decisionmakers whicb is unique for the mod-
ern welfare state and opens up for hitherto unknown innovations
in social policymaking. It is the kind of experiment which may
move future ethical and moral bDundaries. But it is also a
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decentralizing strategy which is challenging the entire political and
administrative organization of the New Zealand welfare state.
(Oyen, 1988).
In 1986 the New Zealand Lahour Prime Minister, David Lan-
ge, took the initiative to establish a Royal Commission on Social
Policy which was to review the entire New Zealand welfare state
through extensive consultation with the people (Terms of reference,
1986). The rationale behind the establlshment of the commission
was many-sided. The Labour government had a new election
coming up the following year, the outcome of which was uncer-
tain. By making crucial social policy issues visible and involving
the many potential voters in the discussion the government stres-
sed its commitment to the welfare state as well as to democratic
procedures in pollcymaking. This fitted well with the early images
of Lange as a humane politician concerned with social issues, and
the Prime Minister himself tailored the terms of reference for the
commission. At the outset the commission was seen by govern-
ment not only as a political instrument, but also as an instrument
for economic reforms. The New Zealand economy was having dif-
ficulties and increasing social expenditures were brought forward
as one of the main reasons for the halting economy. Through the
work of the commission it was believed possible to find measures
of distributing welfare benefits more efficiently and curbing ex-
penses.
The terms of reference stated that the commission "will in-
quire into the extent to which existing instruments of policy meet
the needs of New Zealanders, and report on what fundamental or
significant changes are necessary or desirable in existing policies,
administration, institutions or systems to secure a more fair, hu-
manitarian, consistent, efficient and economical social policy ..... ".
The commission wiIJ report on "The extent to which New Zea-
land meets the standards of a fair society and the main reasons
New Zealand falls short of any of these standards" and "Any as-
sociated matter that may be thought by the Commission to be re-
levant to the general objects of the enquiry" (Terms of reference,
1986).
At a press conference the Prime Minister elaborated on the
terms of reference. The foUowing points are of particular interest
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here. The background for the task of the commlSSlOn was set
against the changing financial situation of New Zealand and the
need for economic growth. The power of the commission was
s~ressed by saying there were no Limits in the commission's capa-
CIty to suggest that future resources be used in different wavs. and
that the work uf the commission was beyund the political p·rucess.
The goal for a fair society was kept vague. but delimited to be a
society free of inflation and unemploymenl. and using the con-
cept of genuine opportunity instead of equality of opportunity.
The term weU-being within the community and the need for a co-
hesive society were other indicators of a fair society (Statement
by Prime Minister, 7 august 1986: Press conference by Prime
Minister, 7 august 1986).
In a widely distributed brochure about the aims of the com-
mission the Prime Minister stated that the government must lis-
ten to the commission, as the commission must listen to the citi-
zens, and people were invited to make written and spoken sub·
missions. The goals for a fairer society in the fuwre were spelled
aLit, and now included education, housing. access to medical ser-
vices, and a social policy "which is not just about the problems of
the disadvantaged". But into the brochure was also written warn-
ings. "Some of our goodwill towards the welfare state is close to
being exhausted", and "some of it no longer serves its purpose".
"We face new pressures" and "Social policy and economic policy
cannot be separated" (A fairer future, 1986).
In the terms of reference was laid down that the commission
shall consult widely with the community, including Maoris, ethnic
and other social groups, and adopt procedures which encourage
people to participate with inputs into the work of the commission.
The commission was also expected to draw upon relevant findings
and experiences from government departments, advisory commit-
tees, task forces of different kinds, and "independent" research-
ers. In the statement by the Prime Minister it was said expressly
that the commission should go broader and deeper in its consul·
tation than any other royal commission had done before, and in
addition that it was an exercise whicb failed if it did not reach out
to the ordinary people.
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The commission pledged to gather as many views as possible.
In the first newsletter from the commission it was stressed that
the commission must discover as far as it can what the widest
cross-section of New Zealanders feel they need. In short, every
citizen who could voice an opinion was asked to give the commis-
sion feedback. In the first newsletter the commission spelled out
the expectations and invited people to come forward with what
they felt was right and wrong with present programmes and what
their concerns were. Concrete experiences with social program-
mes were at the core of the matter, but views about a future path
for the ew Zealand welfare state, ideas about a new scheme for
disability pensions or barriers to further education were consider-
ed just as relevant. Since the goal for the work of the commission
had been widely defined at the outset, the submissions were ex-
pected to cover as wide a range. In the second newsletter a sub-
mission was simply defined as letting the commission know what
a person thinks needs be done to achieve a more just society than
the one at present.
Channels of feedback
The commission spent more than one million ew Zealand dollar
in public relations to arrange meetings in the communities, facili-
tate grassroot-networking, advise groups on how to make submis-
sions and feed media. In order to follow up the intentions of hav-
ing as many in the population as possible participate in the work
of the commission several channels for individual as well as cor-
ponlte and formalized inputs were organized.
The main office for the commission was placed in Wellington,
with another office located in Auckland. The staff included con-
sultants with particular responsibility for liaising with Maoris,
members of the Pacific Island community and disabled persons,
as these groups were seen as being in need of special assistance in
order to further their views. But the staff was available for all
kinds of inquiries and inputs.
[n order to provide more direct access to the members of the
commission two rounus of public meetings were arranged in the
local commUOlues for people to meet with the commISSioners.
The itinerary for the meetings which were held aU over ew Zea-
land was published well ahe,:d. At the first round of meetings ap-
proximately 4000 people attended the publi' hearings. while
"hundreds of thousands" were represented through umbrella and
national organizations (1 ewsletter No. I. 19 7). Written and oral
submissions could be put before the commission at the meetings,
but also presented privately to one of the commissioners. In addi-
tion the commissioners consulted other groups. such as trade
unions. women's groups <tnd Maoris.
An elaborate system of submissions wa developed wherehy
the commission accepted nor only written submissions. but also
acknowledged messages recorded on tape, as well as those pre-
sented orally at a public meeting or at an informal meeting at-
tended by commissionars. The submissions could be on a single
issue or on a whole range of issues which al a later stage would be
sorted out. Earlier submissions to other royal commissions or
other public agencies were also welcomed, as were statemcnls
concerning social issues which had been brought forward in an-
other context. Submissions could be made by individuals, or on
behalf of individuals, as well as by any kinds of groups, public or
private organizations. A fund was available for assisting incli-
viduals and groups to prepare submissions, making sure that fi-
nancial inequalities were not mirrored in the kind of submissions
presented.
A freephone for women was established, where women were
encouraged to give their submissions directly over the phone.
Government departments and larger institutions were invited to
submit papers on particular issues, stating what they thought were
the most important matters to he considered hy the commission.
Papers came not only from the ministries on soci<tl wetr<tre,
health and woman's affairs, but also from the ministry on energy.
Researches were contr<tctedto do projects on prohlems related to
the different aspects of lhe commission's area of responsibility,
although the researchers were pulled into the process only at a
later stage of the consull<tlions.
The deadline for submissions was December 1987, and by then
close to six thousand submissions had been presented. While it
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had been expected that the structure of the feedback channels
might favor the strongest interest groups, the first analysis of the
submissions showed a different picture. The well off middle class,
the business community and the employers, the far right and the
farmers formed a silent majority which apparently was underrep-
resented in the submissions. One hypothesis is that they did not
perceive the activities of the Royal Commission as relevant for
their situation. Another hypothesis is that they felt their interests
were being taken care of in another arena (Oyen, ibid.).
Setting the agenda
The ultimate receiver of the feedback was to be the Cabinet. The
commission had been given the mandate to receive the submis-
sions, select them, sort them and fit them into new patterns be-
fore a final report was presented to government. No formal
guidelines had been established as to how the information was to
be selected. On the contrary, the commission had been publicly
announced as having a free hand and expected not to let itself be
tied down by trivialities.
At the outset the commission had five members, and later was
added a sixth member. The Prime Minister had personally endor-
sed their appointment, but lists of nominees for the commission
had been circulated in political groups and the bureaucracy befo-
rehand, and the final choice of members was a result of a series
of compromises. The members were supposed to represent the
grassroots, in accordance with the populist trend in Labour at the
time of bringing ordinary people back into politics, and none of
the members were to be recruited among academic social policy
experts.
Lt took a while before the commission had sorted out the con-
crete tasks in the terms of reference and decided on the direc-
tions for coming strategies. Although the deadline for the final re-
port gave the commission only until June 1988 (later extended to
September 1988) for finalizing a report, the general sentiment in
the political milieu was implying a different time schedule. The
future life of the commission depended on the outcome of the
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election' in August 19' . If Labour were returne l to power the
commission could expect 10 continue its work amI receive the ne-
cessary funcling. If the Oppo 'ition IVon the election the commis-
sion would likely have been abandoned. cut short of funds or re-
organized. No doubt the progre s of the commission was slowed
down, not only by the formidahle task ahead. but al 0 by the un-
certain outcome of the votes to be cast bv the New Zealanders. .
As it turned out, David Lange was brought back into power
with 46 per cent of the VOles and a majority of 15 seats in parlia-
ment. The work to be achieved by the commission was used ac(-
ively in the political campaign by Labour prior to the elections.
and media coverage of issues drawn from the terms of reference
was widespread.
EX1Jectations :n the political milieu were still that the deadline
for the commission would be postponed. It was becoming quite
evident that the task of the commission was larger than that of
any other royal commission before. and the present deadline
looked unrealistic. If deferred further the new deadline would ap-
proach the next elections in 1990. and the work of the commis-
sion could once more be used successfulJy in the political cam-
paign of the Labour party.
During the campaign prior to the elections it had become evi-
dent that the public interest in the issues raised by the commis-
sion was far more pervasive than the politicians could have sus-
pected when first bri.nging the matter forward. The idea of telling
the people have their say about their own concrete future was
catching on, not only at the organizational level, but also at the
grClssroot level. Ordinary people were grasping the unique oppor-
tunity to voice their opinion on all those everyday matters of qua-
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lity of life they were unhappy about, in their own words and on
their own terms, without having to abstract them into bureaucra-
tic or political terms. Evidently the setting of the agenda was
moving into new hands.
Scrambling for control
To the politicians the success of their initiative was undermining
their own influence on the outcome of the inquiry. The need for
government to control the social policy agenda was closely linked
to the ongoing economic policies. In spite of a certain economic
growth the New Zealand economy was under pressure and the
Lan'ge government was forced to put into effect harsh financial
measures of reshaping budgets, cutting expenditures and attack-
ing unemployment figures getting close to eight per cent. The
move was increasingly towards larger acceptance of the influence
of market forces, the so-called Rogernomics (after the Minister
of Finance Roger Douglas and Reaganomics). The rural sector
was the first to be restructured. So far the welfare budgets had
mostly been left alone, but the many calls for expanding social
programs which came through during the campaign, must have
been very alarming for the architects of economic reforms. If they
were to succeed it was vital to gain control over the most costly
issues in the material collected by the commission.
The commission itself seemed beyond control. Along the way
it became very dedicated to the task at hand and simply went on
with its itinerary of public meetings, consultations and publica-
tions as planned. Like the politicians the commission was stimu-
lated by the extensive response by the public and escalated its ac-
tivities in order to mobilize still larger segments of the popula-
tion. For the left wing of the Labour party the commission be-
came the focal point for resistance against the economic policies
called for by the right wing of the party.
The first kind of control to be introduced on the commission
was the establishment of a committee on Social Equity which was
to sort Ollt the important issues, filter the information and bridge
the conflicts before a final report was presented to the Cabinet.
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The chair was the Deputy Prime Minist~r. and members of the
Committee were the Prim~ Minist~r. [he Minister of Finance. and
other heavies from Cabinet - who in their own du~ time wer~ to
report to themselves.
Another way of tightening th~ controls and diluting the con-
tent of the final report from the commission was the~ establish-
ment ofl7 working parties which were to revi~w not only the re-
POrt, but were [0 add any other material of rdevance for social
policy issues. The bureaucracy was eager [0 have its say. Two sub-
stantial reports on delivery of social services (Milll~~teri{/l Task
Force on Social Sen'ices, July 1987 and Septemb~r 1987) and in-
come maintenance (Ministerial Task Force 0/1 Income Maimen-
ance, December 1987) had already been produced, independently
of the commission. and the conclusions were not in line with the
rna terial collected by the commission. The agenda was firmly set
by giving the different working parties r~sponsibiJity for well de-
fined and limited areas, such as income maintenance, social ser-
vices, housing, etc. Members of the working parti~s were mainly
drawn from the bureaucracy, and they were supposed to act inde-
pendently of their ministers.
The legitimacy for establishing th~ working parties was the
need for coordinating th~ many different views and the prepara-
tion of more coherent reports than the commission would be able
to do. The hidden agenda was the introduction of a whole new
game where power over social policy issues was transferrred back
to the bureaucracy and the politicians.
Another hard blow to the commission came in December 17,
1987 when the Minister of Finance issued an economic statement
concerning new tax reforms which preempted the work of the
commission. Jf implemented the tax reforms would have a larger
impact on the quality of life of the less well off New Zealanders
than any recommendation the commission could come up with.
The radical wing within the Labour party immediately denounced
the new rogernomics, and the head of ew Zealand's Roman
Catholic Church named the government as "heartless and inhu-
man".
Apparently the Prime Minister had not been consulted when
the economic statement was presented on "white paper" instead
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of "green paper". i.e. as a statement from Cabinet instead of a
discussion paper. Whether this is true or not is of little impor-
tance here. The point is that the commission was seen as the
battleground for the well known conflict between the Prime Min-
ister and M"mister of Finance on economic and social issues.
The members of the commission threatened to resign and de-
liver the incomplete report in January 1988. The Prime Minister
personally intervened, and in a statement in February disowned
the tax reforms outlined by the minister of Finance. By then the
commission had already lost much of its influence and questions
were raised in mass media as to whether the final report would
have any impact at all.
It may be a long time before it is known what impact the work
of the Royal Commission will have on the New Zealand welfare
state. The issues to be sorted out are not only moral and politicaL
There are also severe methodological problems involved in decid-
ing what "the will of the ordinary people" is. As the term of the
commission was running out social scientists from all over New
Zealand were called upon to help analyze the voluminous sets of
data collected.
Concluding remarks
While decentralization is being forwarded as one of the major
solutions to the serious problems most of the welfare states are
facing, this "solution" may neither be an adequate nor a simple
way of meeting the problems. This is brought out when compar-
ing different kinds of approaches to decentralization in three
small and fairly homogenous countries which all have a long tra-
dition as welfare states.
Decentralization takes many forms as it incorporates a Dum-
ber of variables which can enter into a multitude of different con-
stellations. The Norwegian model is one of cautious experimenta-
tion, brought about in close cooperation between the various ad-
ministrative bodies and interested parties. This is in accordance
with the Norwegian tradition after the second world war as that
of a negotiating stale (Olsen, 1988: ch. 7). The Danish model is a
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typical lOp-down approach. initiated b the central bureaucra'y
and sanctioned by a Conservative government which is furthering
decentralization and debureaucratization in oeneral. The lower
adn:inistrative levels are being bypassed in th: process as the ex-
penment is aimed at incorporating the voice of the ordinary
people. implying that debureaucratization may tar! at the local
level. At this stage it is too early to predict the outcome of the
p.roject as nothing has been decided neither concerning the analy-
SIS of the results, nor the pos ible administrative implementation
of a decentralized structure. The ew Zealand model i also a
top-down approach, undertaken by the Labour party, and resisted
by the bureaucracy as well as other political bodies. This kind of
decentralization was in the outset designed to become a bottom-
up approach, but when proved successful as such, was overtaken
by powerful political processes repre enting vested interests in
the outcome of the feedback from the grassroots.
Characteristic for the three model above are the attempts to
serve several purposes at the the same time, some of which are
clearly incompatible and implying goals that are counteractive to
the social policy intentions which were the legitimating force be-
hind decentralizing. AU the three countries are on the search for
a renewal of the welfare state. But they are also captives of their
previous history and the system of social programs and professio-
nal groups developed to serve the welfare state. Once established
the social programs become a power base of their own which are
likely to resist change when their area of responsibility is threat-
ened. This resistance represents not only a blocking of new re-
forms, but also a defence against a general curtailment of the wel-
fare state.
The interests of the state do only in part coincide with those of
the welfare state. Identifiable within the mature capitalist state
are contradictions which are reflected in the evolution of the wel-
fare tate. Social programs are designed to bridge the problems
inherent in the capitalist states, but in their construction the pro-
grams always fall short of the ideal solution, thereby incorpora-
ting the contradictions of the state (Him,melstrand, ~986). ?e.een-
tralizing is an example of a strategy trylOg to combme pnnclples
of extended democracy with the need for central control. So far
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no administrative system has been created which can make any
large scale patchwork approach, or even the ew Zealand experi-
ment, survive over time without fragmenting the power of the
state or evoking conflicts between economic and social goals. If
the adversaries are to be pacified it seems politically necessary
that the significance of the social programs be reduced propor-
tionally to the degree of decentralization implemented.
Introducing reforms successfully in the public sector depends
on several factors, and the more comprehensive the reform the
less likely it is to succeed in accordance with the original inten-
tions (March and Olsen, 1983). Reforms in the arena of social po-
licy are likely to be even more difficult to carry through. The ma-
ture welfare state has turned into one of the most important insti-
tutions of redistribution, second only to the labor market and the
family. In some countries social expenditures constitutes up to
one third of all public expenditures, one fifth of the population
get their entire economic support in benefits in cash, while many
more receive benefits in kind through institutional care, health
services, etc. Any attempt of decentralization is a challenge to the
established pattern of distributing benefits and services, both to
the beneficiaries, as well as to the administrative system and the
rest of the national economy. The implied moral paradox is that
the kind of decentralization which is most likely to succeed is the
sort which either maintains the present distribution of benefits
and services or favors those groups that voices the strongest pro-
tests.
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